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COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AND THE RIGHT TO
RE-ENTER THE UNITED STATES
J.NicholasMurosko*
INTRODUCTION
Americancitizensgenerallyenjoytheabilitytomovefreelyfrom placetoplace.
Whethersomeonewishestotravelacrosseitherastateortheglobe,therearerela-
tivelyfew government-imposedbarrierstosuchmovement.Forinstance,mostU.S.
citizensareaffectedonlybygovernment-imposedpassportrequirementswhentraveling
internationally;thus,inmostcases,government-imposedrestrictionsonleavingthe
countryareanon-factor.Itisimportant,however,nottotaketheabilitytotravelfreely
forgrantedbecauseitisconceivablethatamajorthreattopublichealthcouldcause
theU.S.governmenttorestricttravel.Considerableharm couldbefallthecountryifa
personwithahighlycontagiousdiseaseboardsaplaneboundfortheUnitedStates.
Accordingly,thegovernmenthasajustifiablystronginterestinmaintainingcontrol
overitsborders.
This Note examines the federal governments authority to prevent U.S. citizens
from re-enteringthecountryaftertravelingabroad.ThisNoteisnotconcernedwith
non-citizenentryintotheUnitedStatesormovementofanypersonswithintheUnited
Statess borders. Additionally, this Note does not seek to explore, in depth, any con-
stitutional protections for a citizens ability to exit thecountryatatimeofhisorher
liking.Rather,itisnarrowlyconcernedwiththeconstitutionalrightofaU.S.citizen
tore-enterthecountry.
Constitutionalrightsbecomeespeciallycrucialwhenexigentcircumstancespit
theprotectedrightsofanindividualagainsttheneedsofthemajority.Therightto
re-enter the United States is therefore most important when a persons return to the
countryposesathreattoasubstantialnumberofpeople.Forthepurposesofthis
Note,themostnotableexigentcircumstancethatcouldthreatentherighttore-enter
isthepossibilityofaseriouscommunicablediseaseoutbreak.
ThisNotebeginsbyexploringthehistoryandbackgroundoftherighttore-enter
inordertofleshoutthecurrentscopeofthisacknowledged,yetlargelyuntested,consti-
tutionalright.ThisNotethenproffersfourcriteriathatestablishtheconstitutional
righttore-enterprotection.Afterestablishingthetextualhomefortherighttore-
enter,thisNotedelvesintoabalancinganalysisbetweenpublichealthandindividual
rights.Thisanalysiswillbeperformedinthecontextofacommunicabledisease
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outbreak.A morefrequentlylitigatedbarriertore-entry(theNoFlyList)willbe
usedtoprovideausefulcomparison,becausecourtshavenotextensivelytestedsuch
rightinthecontextofcommunicablediseases.
I.COMMUNICABLEDISEASES
Ebola is a deadly disease caused by infection with one of the Ebola virus strains.1
TheWorldHealthOrganizationfirstannouncedthemostrecentEbolaoutbreakon
March23,2014,2 later deeming it the largest and most complex Ebola outbreak
since the Ebola virus was first discovered in 1976.3 Currently,thereisnoknown
cureforEbola,andtheaveragefatalityrateisaround50% butcanreachupto90%.4
The2014outbreakpredominatelycenteredintheWestAfricancountriesofGuinea,
Liberia,andSierraLeone;however,afew confirmedcasesofthediseasewerere-
portedintheUnitedStates.5 Bysomeestimates,ifthesameoutbreakandrateof
deathseeninWestAfricaweretooccurintheUnitedStates,approximately88,000
Americanswoulddie.6
OnJuly28,2014,theCentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention(CDC)an-
nouncedthattwoU.S.citizenscontractedtheEbolaviruswhileperforminghealthcare
workinLiberia.7 Theworkers,lateridentifiedasNancyWritebolandDr.Kent
1 About Ebola Virus Disease,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov.3,
2015),http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/about.html[http://perma.cc/53K3-JVSW].
2 See Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea,WORLD HEALTH ORG.(Mar.23,2014),http://
www.who.int/csr/don/2014_03_23_ebola/en/[http://perma.cc/F8X5-XLN9];Ebola Virus
Disease in Guinea,WORLD HEALTH ORG.REGIONAL OFF.FOR AFR.(Mar.23,2014),http://
www.afro.who.int/en/clusters-a-programmes/dpc/epidemic-a-pandemic-alert-and-response
/outbreak-news/4063-ebola-hemorrhagic-fever-in-guinea.html[htp:/perma.cc/H2AA-S5WS];
see also Previous Updates: 2014 West Africa Outbreak,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL &
PREVENTION,htp:/www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/previous-updates.html
[http://perma.cc/9K6N-MYXU](lastupdatedJan.14,2016)(explainingthattheCentersfor
DiseaseControlandPreventionbecameawareoftheoutbreakinWestAfricainMarch2014
andmadeanannouncementonMarch25,2014).
3 Ebola Virus Disease: Fact Sheet No. 103,WORLD HEALTH ORG.,http://www.who.int
/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/#[http://perma.cc/R7JB-NYZY](lastupdatedJan.2016).
4 Id.;see also JeremyAshkenasetal.,How Many Ebola Patients Have Been Treated
Outside of Africa?,N.Y.TIMES,htp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/31/world/africa
/ebola-virus-outbreak-qa.html(lastupdatedJan.26,2015);AlexandraSifferlin,Heres the
Difference Between MERS and Ebola,TIME(June8,2015),http://www.time.com/3910571
/mers-ebola/[http://perma.cc/L636-QV3G].
5 Questions and Answers: 2014 Ebola Outbreak,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL &
PREVENTION [hereinafterEbola Q&A 1],http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014
-west-africa/qa.html[http://perma.cc/J4LR-W2J7](lastupdatedDec.29,2015).
6 JamesG.Hodge,Jr.etal.,Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak,42J.L.MED.& ETHICS 595,595(2014).
7 CDCHealthAlertNetwork,Ebola Virus Disease Confirmed in a Traveler to Nigeria,
Two U.S. Healthcare Workers in Liberia,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL & PREVENTION
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Brantly,wereeventuallybroughtbacktoanAtlantahospitalwheretheyrecovered.8
AlthoughthestoryreachedahappyendingforWritebolandBrantly,itwascer-
tainlypossiblethatthelife-savingtreatmentcouldhavecometoolateornotatall.
It also was not a forgone conclusion that Writebols and Brantlys status as U.S. citizens
wouldguaranteetheirreturntothiscountryanditssuperiormedicalfacilities.
If public opinion was determinative of the missionaries eligibility to return to
theUnitedStates,WritebolandBrantlymayhavebeendeniedre-entry.Whennews
brokeoftheplantobringthem backtoU.S.soil,itevokedanuneasyresponsefrom
manyAmericans.9 DramatizationsofEbolainpopularculture,books,andmovies
likelycausedthefearthatcontributedtothisbacklash.10DonaldTrump,realestate
moguland2016presidentialhopeful,madehisview onthematterclearwhenhe
tweeted, Stop the EBOLA patients from entering the U.S. Treat them, at the highest
level, over there. THE UNITED STATES HAS ENOUGH PROBLEMS!11
Anotherprominentfigureand2016presidentialhopeful,Dr.BenCarson,also
opposedbringingWritebolandBrantlybacktotheUnitedStates.12Carsonreasoned
thattherewerewaystotreatinfectedAmericansoverseasthatwouldbejustaseffective
astreatingthem athome.13 Carson also argued that a logical benefit-to-risk analy-
sis favored disallowing re-entry until the threat of transmission had passed.14
A. The Tuberculosis Traveler
FearofcontagiousAmericantravelerscanreadilyturnintoangerandanimosity.
The 2007 debacle surrounding Andrew Speaker, the tuberculosis traveler, is
(July 28,2014,4:30 PM),http://emergency.cdc.gov/han/han00363.asp [http://perma.cc
/AX92-RJQX].
8 See MaggieFox,Docs Declare Ebola Patients Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol No
Risk to Public,NBC NEWS,http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/docs
-declare-ebola-patients-kent-brantly-nancy-writebol-no-risk-n185626[http://perma.cc/2ZSN
-GUF5](lastupdatedAug.21,2014,3:30PM).
9 See JoelAchenbachetal.,American Doctor Infected with Ebola Returns to U.S.,
WASH.POST (Aug.2,2014),https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/us
-confirms-2-americans-with-ebola-coming-home-for-treatment/2014/08/01/c20a27cc-1995
-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html[http://perma.cc/J3FV-2UTV].
10 See id.;see, e.g.,AlyssaRosenberg,The Best Movie to Watch During the Current
Ebola Outbreak,WASH.POST(Aug.4,2014),https://washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp
/2014/08/04/the-best-movie-to-watch-during-the-current-ebola-outbreak/[htp:/perma.cc/UT4X
-Z8PN].
11 DonaldJ.Trump(@realDonaldTrump),TWITTER (August1,2014,5:22AM),https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/495182739310936064[http://perma.cc/N6L2-T7Z8](as
ofJan.28,2016,thetweetwasliked998timesandretweeted1,219times).
12 See BenS.Carson,How to Keep Ebola out of America,WASH.TIMES (Oct.7,2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/7/carson-how-to-keep-ebola-out-of-amer
ica/[http://perma.cc/5VGD-N8XN].
13 Id.
14 Id.
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illustrativeofthepotentialproblemsofre-entry.15SpeakerisaU.S.citizenwhotook
aninternationalflighttoEuropeshortlyafterbeingdiagnosedwithaparticularly
lethalstrainoftuberculosis(TB).16 In January 2007, an X-ray of Speakers ribs
indicatedapossibleTB infection.17AccordingtotheCDC,doctorsrepeatedlytold
Speakerthatheshouldnottravel.18 Aroundthesametime,localhealthofficials
began investigating their legal authority to prevent Speaker from traveling.19 In
spiteofthesemeasures,Speakerflew toParisonMay12,2007,twodaysearlier
thanheoriginallyplanned.20 Afterlearningthatheleftthecountry,theCDC told
SpeakernottoreturntotheUnitedStatesandinsteadtocheckintoanearbyhospital
forevaluation.21 The CDC subsequently issued an electronic border alert requiring
borderagentstoisolateSpeakershouldheattempttore-entertheUnitedStates.22
Notwithstanding thisrestriction,Speakermanaged to take severalflightsand
ultimately return to the United States through Canada all while harboring a highly
dangerousandinfectiousdisease.23ThemediavilifiedSpeaker,andpublicoutrage
tooktheform ofhatemailanddeaththreats.24
TheSpeakerstoryhighlightstwopointsthatareimportantfortheoverallpur-
poseofthisNote.First,aninfectedcitizenabroadmaynotbeabletocountonthe
goodwillofhiscountrymentoensurehisreturn.Rather,suchacitizenmayhaveto
relyonconstitutionalargumentstoeffectuatehistriphome.Second,theunavoidable
conclusionisthatthegovernmentneedstoaddmorecertaintyandlegitimacyinits
approachestothesesituations.Itistroublingthatthegovernmentcouldnotmitigate
thispotentiallyseriousthreat.Moredisconcerting,however,isthefactthattheCDC
knew theidentityofthetraveler,whichoughttohavemadecontainmenteasier.
B. The 2014 Ebola Outbreak
Returning to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, a previous version of the CDCs Questions
and Answers on Ebola pamphlet seems to address the consternation surrounding
15 See generally HilaryA.Fallow,Comment,Reforming Federal Quarantine Law in the
Wake of Andrew Speaker: The Tuberculosis Traveler, 25J.CONTEMP.HEALTHL.&POLY
83 (2008) (In the early summer of 2007, the nation was shocked to learn that Andrew Speaker,
athirty-oneyearoldpersonalinjurylawyerfrom Atlanta,Georgia,hadtakenseveralinter-
national flights while infected with a rare and lethal strain of tuberculosis (TB).).
16 VikkiValentine,A Timeline of Andrew Speakers Infection,NPR (June6,2007),http://
www.npr.org/news/specials/tb/.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 See PeterLattman,Tough Times for Andrew Speaker, Esq., and TB Patient,WALL ST.
J.:L.BLOG (Sept.14,2007,3:42PM),http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/14/tough-times-for
-andrew-speaker-esq-and-tb-patient/.
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thedecisiontobringbacktheinfectedAmericans.25 Inthepamphlet,theagency
affirmatively declared that a citizen has the right to return to the United States.26
Thisisaverysimplifiedexplanationofacomplexconstitutionalright.Regardless
of what the CDCs pamphlet says, the right of a U.S. citizen to re-enter the country
isnotabsolute.
Forstarters,theCDCdiscussesmethodsusedtorestrictre-entryintheverysame
pamphletthatdeclaredtheexistenceofthisright.27 Somewhatparadoxically,the
more recent CDC pamphlet both chronicles screening protocols and provides for
taking any necessary public health action, despite the previous version discussing
therighttore-entryasanabsoluteright.28 Additionally,variousstatutesexplicitly
providefortheexclusionofcitizensfrom thecountryundertheprecisecircum-
stancesfacedbyWritebol,Brantly,andSpeaker.29 Forexample,42U.S.C.§265
grants the Surgeon General power to prohibit . . . the introduction of persons . . .
from such countries or places as he shall designate in order to avert the introduction
ofdiseaseintotheUnitedStates.30Thisstatutemakesnodistinctionbetweencitizens
andnon-citizens,and,moreover,thestatutedoesnotdescribe,withanydetail,the
thresholdseverityneededtotriggeritsenforcement.31 Attheveryleast,boththe
CDCs policies and the relevant statutes make the situation much murkier than the
black-and-white assertion that a citizen has the right to return to the United States.32
Fortunately,the2014Ebolaoutbreaksubsided.33 Thatdoesnotmeanthatthis
issueshouldbeputonthebackburner.Becausethethreatofcommunicablediseases
is certain to be a recurring narrative in the 21st century, it is imperative that our
globalhealthorganizations,worldleaders,andevenourlegalsystemslearnfrom
25 Questions and Answers on Ebola,CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
[hereinafterEbola Q&A 2],http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/24819/cdc_24819_DS1.pdf[htp:/
perma.cc/GSV9-JSQV](lastupdatedAug.28,2014).
26 Id. (Q: Why were the ill Americans with Ebola brought to the U.S. for treatment?
How is CDC protecting the American public? A: A U.S. citizen has the right to return to
theUnitedStates.AlthoughCDC canuseseveralmeasurestopreventdiseasefrom being
introducedintheUnitedStates,CDC mustbalancethepublichealthrisktootherswiththe
rights of the individual.).
27 Id. (noting that the CDC can use several measures to prevent disease from entering the
UnitedStates,butthatitmustalsobalancethepublichealthriskwiththerightsofindividuals).
28 Compare id. (discussingtherighttore-entryasanabsoluteright),with Ebola Q&A 1,
supra note5.
29 See 42U.S.C.§264(2012);id. §265.
30 Id. §265.
31 See id.
32 Ebola Q&A 2,supra note25;see also 42U.S.C.§265.
33 See KevinSieff,U.S.-Built Ebola Treatment Centers in Liberia Are Nearly Empty as
Outbreak Fades,WASH.POST (Jan.18,2015),https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa
/us-built-ebola-treatment-centers-in-liberia-are-nearly-empty-as-disease-fades/2015
/01/18/9acc3e2c-9b52-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html[http://perma.cc/T7SA-7QT5].
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theserecenttroubles.34 Aninformeddialogueconcerningtheinterplaybetween
publichealthandourlegalsystem mayhelpcurbsomeofthefearandcallousness
demonstratedwhensickcitizensreturnhome.35Inparticular,itiscriticallyimportant
tounderstandmorefullytheorigin,textualhook,andscopeoftherighttoreturnto
theUnitedStates.
II.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THERIGHT TO RE-ENTER
Protectionsfortherighttotravelpredatethiscountryandwerefamiliartoour
earlyEnglishpredecessors.TheMagnaCarta,createdin1215,explicitlyprovided:
It shall be lawful to any person . . . to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely
andsecurely,bylandorbywater,savinghisallegiancetous,unlessitbeintimeof
war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom . . . .36Centuries
of common law decisions have interpreted and sculpted the right to travel abroad a
freedom which remained acknowledged during William Blackstones era.37Never-
theless,protectionsforthefreedom totravelfreelyweresomewhatdubious,oreven
ineffective,atcertaintimesinEnglishhistory.38Theabilitytomovefrom oneEn-
glishcolonytoanotherwasneverseriouslyprotectednorlimitedbyEnglishlaw,
asthoughthatfreedom wassimplytakenforgranted.39Onenotableexceptiontothis
34 LenaH.Sunetal.,Ebolas Lessons, Painfully Learned at Great Cost in Dollars and
Human Lives,WASH.POST (Dec.28,2014),https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health
-science/ebolas-lessons-painfully-learned-at-great-cost-in-dollars-and-human-lives
/2014/12/28/dcc8c50a-87c2-11e4-a702-fa31ff4ae98e_story.html[htp:/perma.cc/6SGE-NLU5].
35 See generally RebeccaA.Weldon,An Urban Legend of Global Proportion: An
Analysis of Nonfiction Accounts of the Ebola Virus,6J.HEALTH COMM.281, 29293 (2001)
(observingthatalarmistdepictionsofthreatsto public health increase ignorance regarding
our biological relationship with our world).
36 MAGNA CARTA,art.XLII (statingthattherighttotraveldescribedinthedocumentis
notabsolute;rather,itmaybecurtailedduringcertainenumeratedexigencieslikewarand
doesnotapplytocertainclassesofpeoplelikeprisonersandoutlaws).
37 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES ON THELAWS OF ENGLAND 265(George
Sharswooded.,J.B.LippincottCo.1893)(17651769), oll.libertyfund.org/titles/blackstone
-commentaries-on-the-laws-of-england-in-four-books-vol-1 (By the common law, every man
may go out of the realm for whatever cause he pleaseth, without obtaining the kings leave;
provided he is under no injunction of staying at home . . . .).
38 See generally 5Rich.2,stat.1,c.2(1381)(Eng.),reprinted in 2STATUTES OF THE
REALM 18(1816)(declaringastatuteunderwhichthepropertyofmostindividualsbecomes
the property of the king if they leave the realm without the kings permission); see also 4Jac.
1,c.1,§4(1606)(Eng.),reprinted in 4STATUTES OF THEREALM 18(1816)(repealing,after
225years,theaforementioned1381statutewherebyindividualsforfeitedtheirpropertyby
travelingabroadwithoutpermission);JeffreyKahn,International Travel and the Consti-
tution,56UCLA L.REV.271(2008).
39 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,JR.,THREEHUMAN RIGHTS IN THECONSTITUTION OF 1787,
at 162, 177 (1956) (noting that [b]eyond a few scattered provisions of this sort, the charters
seem to have taken internal freedom of movement for granted).
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laissez-faireattitudetowardtherighttotravelwastheRhodeIslandCharter,which
guaranteed the right to passe and repasse with freedome, into and through the rest
of the English Collonies, vpon their lawfull and civill occasions [sic].40Later,the
revolutionary era brought some restrictions to the colonists ability to travel freely.41
In fact, the restriction of freedom of movement was one of the injuries and usurpa-
tions listed in the Declaration of Independence.42
Given our early legal systems somewhat vacillating approach to protecting the
righttotravelfreely,itisnotentirelysurprisingthattheConstitutionissilentregard-
ingfreedom ofmovement.43 The Constitutions lack of an explicit textual hook for
the right to travel, however, belies the Framers intent to guarantee this freedom. The
course of the Constitutions development highlights several indicia of a desire to
protecttravel.
Forstarters,theArticlesofConfederationexplicitlyaddressedthefreedom to
travel, providing that the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other state.44 Undertheindependentstateschemesetforthbythe
ArticlesofConfederation,thisessentiallyamountedtoprotectionforquasi-interna-
tionaltravel.TheFramersofthe1789Constitutionretainedmuchofthetextsur-
rounding the Articles of Confederations ingress and regress clause, yet declined
to carry the precise ingress and regress language over to the new document.45At
leastonescholarcontendsthatthisomissionshouldnotbetakenasadecisionbythe
Framerstocurtailtherighttotravel,asthatrightwasnevertrulythreatenedineither
thecoloniesorduringtheearlyhistoryofthenation.46 Additionally,acommon
draftingtechniqueindicatesintenttoprotectthisrightnotwithstandingthelackof
40 RHODEISLAND ROYAL CHARTER OF 1663,http://sos.ri.gov/divisions/Civics-And-Educa
tion/charter-1663[http://perma.cc/95TC-4GEL];see also THELIBERTIES OFTHEMASSACHU-
SETTS COLLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND,art.17(1641)http://history.hanover.edu/texts/masslib
.html [http://perma.cc/P355-QDBC] (Every man of orwithinthisJurisdictionshallhavefree
libertie,notwithstandinganyCivillpowertoremovebothhimselfe,andhisfamilieattheir
pleasure out of the same, provided there be no legall impediment to the contrarie [sic].).
41 Kahn,supra note 38, at 28586.
42 Id.
43 CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 18587.
44 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of1781,art.IV,para.1.
45 See CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 185 (The third clause about privileges of trade and
commerce can be regarded as embraced in the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Constitu-
tion repeats the first clause almost verbatim, in Article IV, section 2: The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. But
there is not a trace of the second clause on free ingress and regress . . . .); see also AKHIL
REEDAMAR,AMERICAS CONSTITUTION:ABIOGRAPHY 251(2005)(dismissingtheomission
as merely carving off excess and confusing verbiage).
46 See CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 18687 ([N]obody spoke of barriers . . . against
persons.Verylikelynonehadbeenerected.TheywouldhaveviolatedtheArticlesofCon-
federationandalsowhatI haveassumedtobethelongpracticeinfactduringthecolonial
period. So the silence in the Convention does not seem significant . . . .).
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an explicit textual hook. The omission of the ingress and regress language in the
Constitutionmaybeexplainedbythenotionthatthefreedom ofmovementwas
already considered essential to liberty and did not require specific enumeration.47
III.DISTINCTION BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FREEDOMS
Itisnow appropriatetomaketheimportantdistinctionbetweenthefreedom to
travelacrossstatelinesandthefreedom totravelacrossnationalborders.Thefree-
dom totraveldomesticallyandthefreedom totravelinternationally,despitefalling
underthelargerumbrellaoffreedom ofmovementgenerally,aredistinctrights
affordeddifferentlevelsofprotection.TheSupremeCourthastreatedtherightto
foreigntravellessfavorablythantherighttodomestictravel.48Onejustificationfor
thisdistinctioncomesfrom thenotion thatthereisapragmaticneedtoprotect
domestictravelinordertoprotectotherrights.
Likeforeigntravel,travelbetweenthestatesoftheUnionisnot
arightexplicitlyfoundintheConstitution.TheCourtneverthe-
lessprotectedthisrightasameansofprotectingotherrights,
powers,ordesignsmoredirectlyexpressedintheConstitution.
Thus,thefreedom totravelbetweenstateshasbeengivenheight-
enedprotectionbecauseitfunctionstoaddvaluetotherights
and freedoms identified more easily in the Constitutions text:
associationalfreedoms,theparticipationofcitizensinfederal
self-governance,andthepursuitofindividualandnationaleco-
nomicprosperity.49
Theconstitutionalrighttotravelfrom onestatetoanotheris virtuallyunquali-
fied.50 By contrast, the right to travel internationally can be considered, at best, an
aspect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.51ThisNotewillnow focusononlythefreedom ofinternationalmovement
and,inparticular,therighttore-entertheUnitedStates.
47 See, e.g.,THEFEDERALIST NO.84,at537(AlexanderHamilton)(HenryCabotLodge
ed., G.P. Putnams Sons 1895) (1787) ([W]hy declare that things shall not be done which
thereisnopowertodo?Why,forinstance,shoulditbesaidthatthelibertyofthepressshall
not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?).
48 See Kahn,supra note 38, at 286 (The Court granted strong constitutional protections
forinterstatetravel,butpermittedrestrictionofforeigntravelwithinthefarlessprotective
bounds of due process.).
49 Id. at287.
50 Califanov.Torres,435U.S.1,4n.6(1978).
51 Id.
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A. Freedom of Foreign Movement
Moving from the revolutionary era into our nations more recent history, we
havegenerallystrengthenedoursupportfortherighttointernationaltravel.The
freedom to travel and specifically the narrower right of re-entry after having
traveled abroad numbers amongst the rights contained in the 1948 Universal
DeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR).52 TheUDHR,signedbytheUnitedStates
and scores of other nations, contains a provision that [e]veryone has the right to
leaveanycountry,includinghisown,and to return to his country.53 In1956,
however,shortlyafterCongresssignedontothisseeminglyunambiguousendorse-
mentofafundamentalrighttotravelinternationally,theU.S.DepartmentofState
adoptedameasurethatrestrictedsuchtravel.54 Thisnew regulationprovidedthe
foundation for the passport cases the most extensive Supreme Court review of the
righttotravelabroad.55
The U.S. Department of State, by this point in the nations history, held the
powertoacceptorrejectpassportapplications.56 The1956regulationallowedfor
thedenialofapassporttoanypersonwhoseconductabroadwouldbedetrimental
toAmericaninterests.57 Thisregulationwasbroadinitslanguageandapplication.
A similarregulationprovidedthattheSecretaryofStatecouldrestrictpassportsfor
communistsorcommunistsympathizers.58 Underthispolicy,theU.S.Department
ofStatedeniedapassporttoArthurMiller,preventinghim from seeingaperfor-
manceofhisplay,The Crucible,inBrussels.59 TheU.S.DepartmentofStatealso
deniedapassporttoRockwellKent,findingthathewasacommunist.60TotheU.S.
Department of States credit, it did provide for judicial review of its determinations,
whichKentusedtoappealhispassportdenialtotheU.S.SupremeCourt.61Through
52 CHAFEE,supra note39,at162.
53 G.A.Res.217(III)A,UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,art.13cl.2(Dec.10,
1948)(emphasisadded).
54 22 C.F.R. § 51.136 (1956) (In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the
UnitedStates,passportfacilities,exceptfordirectandimmediatereturntotheUnitedStates,
wilberefusedtoapersonwhenitappearstothesatisfactionoftheSecretaryofStatethatthe
persons activities abroad would: (a) Violate the laws of the United States; (b) be prejudicial
totheorderlyconductofforeignrelations;or(c)otherwisebeprejudicialtotheinterestsof
the United States.).
55 See, e.g.,Haigv.Agee,453U.S.280(1981);Jonesv.Helms,452U.S.412(1981);
Kentv.Dulles,357U.S.116(1958).ThePassportCasesexemplifycasesbroughtinresponse
totherestrictionsplacedoninternationaltravel.
56 See CHAFEE,supra note39,at194.
57 22C.F.R.§51.136(1956).
58 22C.F.R.§51.135(1952).
59 CHAFEE,supra note39,at197.
60 Kent, 357 U.S. at 11718.
61 See 22C.F.R.§51.137(1952);Kent,357U.S.at118.
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the1958case,Kent v. Dulles, in its first substantial case on the question62offreedom
totraveloutsideoftheUnitedStates,theSupremeCourtacknowledgedthepedigree
oftherighttotravelinternationally:
Freedom ofmovementacrossfrontiersineitherdirection,and
insidefrontiersaswell,wasapartofourheritage.Travelabroad,
liketravelwithinthecountry,maybenecessaryforalivelihood.
Itmaybeasclosetotheheartoftheindividualasthechoiceof
whatheeats,orwears,orreads.Freedom ofmovementisbasic
inourschemeofvalues.63
It is evident from the Courts strong wording in Kent thatfreedom ofmovement
is a right. The Court reaffirmed this, with modest skepticism, in a subsequent case
arisingundersimilarcircumstances;64thus,by1981SupremeCourtjurisprudenceon
therighttotravelinternationallybecamemorealignedwiththeunambiguousendorse-
mentgiventotherightundertheUDHR.Eventoday,however,itissomewhatunclear
where exactly that right comes from, and the textual source of this right has been
the subject of debate.65 Severaltheoriesforthesourceofthisprotection have
emerged. The prior discussion on the omission of the ingress and regress language
from theConstitutionalludedtooneofthem:substantivedueprocess.Thistheory
willnow beexploredinmoredetail,alongwiththreecompetingtheories.
B. Possible Sources of the Right to Re-enter: Criteria
Courtsandscholarsalikehaveprofferedseveraltheoriesforwheretherightto
re-enterthecountryderives.ThisNoteanalyzesfourofthosetheoriessuccessively.
Beforedelvingintothetheories,anobjectivesetofcriteriashouldbedevelopedso
thateachtheorycanbescrutinizedinanempiricalmanner.Theessenceofthefol-
lowingcriteriaisthattherighttore-entertheUnitedStatesshouldbeguaranteedin
atextualhomethatprovidesstrong,butnotabsolute,protection.Tomaketheright
tore-enteranabsoluteandutterlyunyieldingrightwouldbeanerrorbecauseit
would overlook the sheer necessity of the governments role in protecting the public
healthofitscitizens.Ontheotherhand,tomaketherighttore-enteroverlyweak
andpliablewouldalsobeanerrorbecauseitwoulddevaluetheimportanceofthe
abilitytoreturnfrom abroad.Thus,thehomefortherighttore-entermuststrikea
balancebetweenthosetwoendsofthespectrum.Thefollowingcriteriashoulden-
surethattheappropriatebalanceismet.
62 Kahn,supra note38,at302.
63 Kent,357U.S.at126.
64 See Haigv.Agee,453U.S.280,307(1981).
65 Jonesv.Helms,452U.S.412,418(1981).
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1.FirstCriterion:ProtectRe-entryWhereanIndividualCarriesNoSerious
CommunicableDisease
Thefirstcriterionisthesimplest.Itmodestlyholdsthattherighttore-enterthe
countryshouldstandwheretheindividualisneithercontagiousnorathreattothe
publichealthofthenation.Thus,theidealhomefortherighttore-entermustgive
the right at least as much teeth to withstand arbitrary government actions unsup-
portedbyanydemonstrablethreattopublichealth.
2.SecondCriterion:ProtecttheRe-entryWhereanIndividualCarriesaSerious
CommunicableDisease,buttheGovernmentCanTakeReasonableEffortsto
PreventTransmission
Thesecondcriterionisasmurkyasthefirstcriterionissimple.Thiscriterion
holdsthatthehomefortherighttore-entershouldalow therighttostandevenwhere
anindividualcarriesacommunicabledisease,providedthegovernmentcantake
reasonablemeanstocontainthethreatofmasstransmission.Thiscriterioncontem-
platestheexactsituationfacedbyNancyWritebolandDr.KentBrantly.66 Italso
assumesthatthegovernmenttooktherightcourseofactioninbringingthem home
understringentquarantineprecautions.
Essentialy,thiscriterionrequiresthatthetextualhookfortherighttore-enterthe
country be one that permits balancing the individuals interest in returning against
the governments interest in protecting the majority. Thus, the ideal home for the
rightwillbeonewherethejurisprudenceofthetextualhookfocusesonweighing
andbalancingcompetinginterests.
3. Third Criterion: Do Not Constrain the Governments Responses to Imminent
andCertainOtherThreatstoPublicHealth
Thethirdcriterionrepresentsthepragmaticstancethat,atacertainpoint,the
governmentmustdowhatisnecessarytoensurethepublichealthofthemajority,
even if it runs against the individuals right to re-enter the country. Therefore, this
criterionrequiresthattherightbeguaranteedbyaconstitutionalprovisionthatis
non-absolute.Furtherexplanationisnecessary.
Although [i]t is a widely held opinion that there are no absolute rights,67such
view alsohasitsdetractors.68 Atanyrate,thisphilosophicaldebatedoesnotneed
toberesolvedforthepurposesofthisNote.ThisNotemakesnoassertionthatthe
righttore-enterthecountryis,orevenoughttobe,absolute.Ifthereareabsolute
66 See supra notes 78 and accompanying text.
67 AlanGewirth,Are There Any Absolute Rights?,31PHIL.Q.1(1981).
68 See, e.g.,id. at2(arguingthattherearecertainabsoluterights).
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rights,thiscriterionsimplyholdsthattherighttore-enterthecountryshouldnotbe
one of them. If there are no absolute rights, this criterion holds that the individuals
righttore-enterthecountryshouldyieldinsituationswherethegovernmentaction
isnecessarytopreventimminentandcertainthreatstopublichealth.
4.FourthCriterion:HarmonizetheProvisionwithRelatedActs
Thefourth,andfinal,criterionaddressesadifferentconcernthanthosebehind
thefirstthreecriteria.Ratherthanensuringabalanceinthestrengthoftherightto
re-enter,thelastcriterionsimplyconcernssuitability.A majorcanonofstatutory
interpretationisthenotionthatastatutoryprovisionshouldbeconstruedtoharmo-
nizewiththerestoftheactofwhichitisapart.69Similarly,aprovisionshouldbe
construedtoharmonizewiththeprovisionsofotherrelatedacts.70Inthesamevein,
therighttore-entershouldbeprotectedinatextualhomethatprotectssimilarrights.
For the purposes of this criterion, a particular right is similar to the right to re-
enteriftherightshavecomparablehistoricaldevelopmentandimportance.Also
relevanttothiscomparisonisthelevelofpervasiveness:whethertherighttore-enter
andtherightitisbeingcomparedtoareexercisedbycitizenswiththesamefrequency.
IV.POSSIBLESOURCES OF THERIGHT TO RE-ENTER:CRITERIA APPLIED
Armedwiththeaforementionedcriteria,eachofthepossiblehomesfortheright
tore-entercannow beanalyzedinaformulaicmanner.Thecriteriawillbeapplied
tothefollowingtextualhomesthatscholarsandcourtshaveprofferedassourcesfor
therighttotravelinternationally:(1)thePrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseofArticle
IV,Section2oftheConstitution;(2)anintegralcomponentofwhatitmeanstobe
aU.S.citizen;(3)theFirstAmendment;and(4)thesubstantivedueprocessdoctrine
oftheFifthAmendment.Importantly,thesetheoriesoriginatedinthecontextofthe
righttointernationaltravelgenerally,nottherighttore-enterspecifically.Thatsaid,
theoriesputforwardforthesourceoftherighttotravelinternationallyprovidean
excellentstartingpointforanalyzingthenarrowerissueofreturningtothecountry.
A. Privileges and Immunities
Thefreedom toreturntothecountrymaybeconsideredaprivilegebelonging
toU.S.citizenspursuanttoArticleIV,Section2oftheConstitution.71 Afterall,
69 See, e.g.,FDA v.Brown& WilliamsonTobaccoCorp.,529U.S.120,133(2000);FTC
v.MandelBros.,359U.S.385,389(1959).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 53031 (1998); United
Statesv.Fausto,484U.S.439,453(1988).
71 U.S.CONST. art IV, § 2 (The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.).
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courtshaveusedthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseofArticleIV assupportfor
thefreedom ofinterstate travel.72InanimportantearlycaseinterpretingArticleIV,
theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofPennsylvaniaheldthatthe
Privileges and Immunities Clause extends to protect [t]he right of a citizen of one
state to pass through . . . any other state.73Therefore,itmayseem tofollow thatthe
sameshouldholdforinternational travelandinternationalre-entry;however,this
theorydoesnotmeetallofthecriteria.Forstarters,itisnotentirelyclearthatthe
PrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseofArticleIV wouldprovideenoughstrengthfor
therighttore-enterthecountrytostandevenintheabsenceofanycommunicable
disease. The Privileges and Immunities Clause was viewed as a means of promot-
ingharmonybetweenthestatesbyrequiringtheequaltreatmentofvisitorsfrom one
state in another.74Thesegoalsarenotfurtheredbycitizenstravelingfreelyonthe
internationalstage.
Additionally,unlikeinterstatetravel,theabilitytoleavethecountryandsubse-
quentlyre-enterisnotnecessarytosupportotheraimsofcitizenshiplikeparticipa-
tioninthefederalgovernment.75 Therefore,thePrivilegesandImmunitiesClause
fails the first criterion it is not likely that this textual hook can provide any teeth
totherighttore-enter.BecausethePrivilegesandImmunitiesClausefailsthefirst
criterion,itnecessarilyfailsthemoredemandingsecondandthirdcriteria.
Thefourthcriterionofharmonyisalsonotsatisfiedbythistextualhook.The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, otherwise known also as the Comity
Clause, speaks against preferential treatment.76 Accordingly, the clause forbids the
statesfrom givingunfavorabletreatmenttovisitingout-of-stateAmericanswith
respecttothebodyofrightsthatconstitutestheprivilegesandimmunitiesofstate
citizenship.77BeyondthefactthatthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseisusedto
protectinterstate travel,thereisscantsupportforharmonizationwithre-enteringthe
country.ThehistoryofthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseoftheConstitutiondoes
notjibewiththerighttore-enterthecountry.ArticleIV,Section2oftheConstitution
isanear-identicalretoolingofArticleIV,Section1oftheArticlesofConfederation.78
Infact,theonlyreadilyapparenttextualdifferencebetweenArticleIV,Section2
oftheConstitutionandArticleIV,Section1oftheArticlesofConfederationisthe
72 See Kahn,supra note38,at288.
73 Corfieldv.Coryell,6F.Cas.546,552(E.D.Pa.1823)(No.3230).
74 Kahn,supra note38,at303.
75 See id. at287.
76 See JohnHarrison,Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause,101YALEL.J.
1385,1398(1992).
77 Id. at1398.
78 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1 (The better to secure and
perpetuatemutualfriendshipandintercourseamongthepeopleofthedifferentstatesinthis
union[and]thefreeinhabitantsofeachofthesestates...shallbeentitledtoallprivileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states . . . .).
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preambleofthelatter,whicharticulatesthegoalofmaintainingrelationsbetween
states.79 ExtrapolatingthepurposeofthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClause,asit
appearsintheArticlesofConfederation,tothecurrentConstitution,showsthatnothing
about Article IV, Section 2 speaks to the right to re-enter. No mutual friendship and
intercourse among citizens of different states is achieved when a given individual
exerciseshisrighttore-enterthecountry.Similarly,therelationsbetweenpeopleof
differentstatesdonotsufferwhenanindividualisdeniedre-entrytotheUnitedStates.
Insum,thetheorythatthetextualhookfortherighttore-enterisfoundinthe
PrivilegesandImmunitiesClauseofArticleIVisunconvincing.Ifthatparticularright
isguaranteedintheConstitution,itmustbeguaranteedunderatextualhookother
thanthePrivilegesandImmunitiesClause.
B. Citizenship
A secondtheoryprofferscitizenshipitselfasthebestsourcefortherighttore-
enterthecountryfrom abroad.80 Thistheorytakesthestancethatourtraditions,
Constitution, and national identity make us citizens of a democratic republic to be
distinguishedfrom meresubjectsofamonarch.81TheratificationoftheFourteenth
Amendment,particularlytheCitizenshipClausecontainedtherein,bolsteredthe
importanceofcitizenship.Inpertinentpart,theFourteenthAmendmentprovides
that [a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the
United States.82 Setting aside, for a moment, the privileges or immunities
languagethatfollowsthepassageexcerptedabove,theCitizenshipClausealone
carriesweight.TheFramersoftheFourteenthAmendmentintendedthisclauseto
overruletheDred Scott decision,butthatmaynothavebeenitssolepurpose.83 It
alsomayhavebeenintendedtoactasanindependentsourceofrights,includingthe
righttotravelinternationally.IftheCitizenshipClauseisacceptedasanindepend-
entsourceforcertainrights,itdoesnotmatterthattheSlaughterhouse Cases Court
jettisoned the privileges or immunities language that follows.84
Unfortunately,however,thistextualhomefailsseveralofthecriteriabecause
it would protect the right to travel and the right to re-enter too strongly. If it is
79 Compare U.S.CONST.art.IV,§2,with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of1781,pmbl.
80 See Kahn,supra note 38, at 323 (The right to depart from and reenter ones country
[is] . . . an intrinsic part of what it means to be a citizen of our democratic republic.).
81 See id. at325(notingthatthedistinctionbetweencitizensandsubjectsisadvancedinArti-
cleIII,Section2oftheConstitutionaswelasintheEleventhAmendmenttotheConstitution).
82 U.S.CONST.amend.XIV,§1.
83 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (The para-
mountreason[forpassingtheCitizenshipClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment]was...to
overruleexplicitlytheDred Scott decision.); see also LisaMariaPerez,Note,Citizenship
Denied: The InsularCasesand the Fourteenth Amendment,94VA.L.REV.1029,1054(2008)
(arguingthattheFramersintendedtocodifythecommonlaw doctrineofjus soli).
84 See Kahn,supra note38,at327.
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decidedthattherighttotravelinternationallyisattheverycoreofwhatitmeansto
beaU.S.citizen,thegovernmentwouldhaveanintolerablydifficulttimeabridging
thatrightinresponsetoaseriouscommunicablediseaseoutbreak.Underthistheory,
a government restriction on an individuals abilitytotravelinternationallywouldtrigger
strictscrutinyandthusrequirethegovernmenttodemonstratethattherestrictionis
theleastrestrictivemeansforachievingacompellinggovernmentinterest.85 That
standard,inisolation,mightprovideanacceptablelevelofprotection,butthethrust
ofthistheoryisthatittipsthescaleinfavorofre-entry.
Accordingly,thishomesatisfiesthefirstcriterionbecauseitwouldensurepro-
tection of an individuals ability to re-enter the country when he poses no threat to
thepublichealthofthenation.Italsosatisfiesthesecondcriterionbecausetheright
wouldcontinuetostandeveniftheindividualpresentsathreattopublichealth,
albeitonethatthegovernmentcantakereasonablestepstocontain.Itfailsthethird
criterion,however,becauseitwouldpreventthegovernmentfrom beingabletoex-
cludeapersonwhopresentsariskthatcannotbecontainedbyreasonablemeans.
Inshort,housingtherighttore-enterthecountryinourconceptionofwhatitmeans
tobeaU.S.citizensimplymakestherighttoostrong.
Finaly,thistheoryfailsthefourthcriterion.Placingtherighttore-enterthecountry
herewouldconstituteasignificantshiftinFourteenthAmendmentjurisprudence.
TheCitizenshipClausehasnotbeencalledontoprotectanysimilarfundamental
rights in fact, [t]he Court has never interpreted the meaning of the Citizenship
Clause,andithasonlyconsideredwhatarightofcitizenshipmightbeinahandful
of cases.86 Itis,therefore,unlikelythattheCourtwouldopenupanentirenew
realm ofconstitutionaljurisprudencejusttoaccommodatetherelativelyuntestedright
totravelinternationaly.Althoughitwouldbeintriguingtotestthetheoryandingrain
therighttore-enterasapowerfulright,itshouldnotbefavored.Itisanunlikely
route,notwithoutshortcomings.
C. First Amendment
Although it is not the most obvious candidate, the First Amendments protection
against abridging the freedom of speech87maybetheguarantoroftherighttore-
enter.ThisisaversionofthestancetakenbyJusticeDouglasintwocasesdecided
inconsecutiveterms:Zemel v. Rusk88andAptheker v. Secretary of State.89InZemel,
85 See id. at330.
86 RebeccaE.Zietlow,Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Binghams
Theory of Citizenship,36AKRON L.REV.717,766(2003).
87 U.S.CONST.amend.I.
88 381U.S.1,24(1965)(Douglas,J.,dissenting)(explainingthattherighttotravelis
necessaryforFirstAmendmentrights).
89 378U.S.500,520(1964)(Douglas,J.,concurring)(analogizingthefreedom oftravel
totherightsofassociationandassembly).
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Justice Douglas argued that the right to travel is at the periphery of the First Amend-
ment90andthattheFirstAmendmentprotectstravelasamethodforlearningand
observing social, physical, political and other phenomena abroad.91 Thisnotion
isderivedfrom FirstAmendmentdoctrineprotectingtherighttoreceive information
andexperiences.92
Theideathatin-personcommunicationsaremorealignedwiththeFirstAmend-
ments goals rather than indirect channels of communication supports Douglass
assertionsthattherighttotravelisprotected,insomeway,bytheFirstAmend-
ment.93 When information in aforeign countryissought,government-imposed
restrictions on travel should not be dismissed as insignificant time-place-manner
regulations of speech.94Proponentsofattributingtherighttotraveltotheumbrella
oftheFirstAmendmentcontendthatthisstrategystrengthenstheprotectionbecause
courtsreviewinganallegedviolationwillapplyahighstandardofreview.95
Ultimately,however,assigningtherighttotravelinternationallytotheauspices
oftheFirstAmendmentisnotideal.Asaninitialmatter,thistheoryarguablyaffords
toomuchprotectionfortherighttotravel.AsthemajorityinZemel observed, There
arefew restrictionsonactionwhichcouldnotbeclothedbyingeniousargumentin
the garb of decreased data flow.96 Thus,thescope ofaFirstAmendment-based
rightcouldbetoobroad.Additionaly,thelevelofprotectionaffordedtoFirstAmend-
mentrightsmayleavethegovernmentshackledwhenconfrontedwithaseriousrisk
topublichealthwhichcouldotherwisebemitigatedbyrestrictingtravel.Restric-
tions on travel that implicate first amendment interests are . . . likely to trigger a
heightened standard of review.97Thus,thestrength oftherightcouldbetoorobust
underthistextualhome.Therefore,placingtherighttore-enterundertheumbrella
oftheFirstAmendmentwouldmaketherightstrongenoughtopassmusterunderthe
firstandsecondcriteria;however,thissourcewouldpossiblyfailthethirdcriterion.
Thethirdcriterioncallsfortherighttore-entertoyieldwhennecessarytopre-
vent a catastrophic and imminent harm to the countrys public health. It cannot be
90 381U.S.at26(Douglas,J.,dissenting).
91 Id. at24.
92 See BarryP.McDonald,The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age,65OHIO ST.L.J.
249,250(2004)(arguingforaFirstAmendmentrighttogatherdifferenttypesofinforma-
tion);see also Stanleyv.Georgia,394U.S.557(1969)(establishingaconstitutionalright
toreceiveinformationandideas);Martinv.CityofStruthers,319U.S.141(1943)(striking
downalocalordinancebanningdoor-to-doorhandbilling).
93 See ThomasE.Laursen,Constitutional Protection of Foreign Travel,81COLUM.L.
REV.902,923(1981).
94 Id.
95 See id. at919.
96 381 U.S. at 1617 (For example, the prohibitionofunauthorizedentryintotheWhite
Housediminishes...opportunitiestogatherinformation...butthatdoesnotmakeentry
into the White House a First Amendment right.).
97 Laursen,supra note93,at919.
2016] THERIGHT TO RE-ENTER THEUNITED STATES 929
saidforcertainwhetherthisrequisiteyieldingwouldoccurhere.Ononehand,the
First Amendments protections are very strong.98 Ontheother,however,theFirst
Amendments protections are not absolute. The freedom of speech and the freedom of
the press may give way when the communication in question is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.99
Similarly, the freedom of religion under the First Amendment is bounded at least in
thesensethatnoteverythingqualifiesasareligion.100Thismightsuggestthat,ifthe
righttore-enterisguaranteedundertheFirstAmendment,it,likethefreedomsof
religion,speech,andthepress,couldyieldwhennecessary.Ifthisisthecase,thenthis
theoryforthesourceoftherighttore-entercouldsatisfythethirdcriterion.Ulti-
mately,thereisnoneedtoactualydeterminewhethertheFirstAmendmentdefini-
tivelysatisfiesthethirdcriterionbecauseitundoubtedlyfailsthefourthcriterion.
Therighttore-enterthecountrydoesnotharmonizewiththerightstraditionally
understoodtofallundertheumbrellaoftheFirstAmendment.101 From theplain
languageoftheFirstAmendment,onecaneasilyextracttheprotectionsforreligion,
speech,press,andassembly.Bycontrast,absolutelynothingspeaksdirectlytoeither
travelortherighttore-enter.Furthermore,thehistoryoftherighttore-enterdoes
notsquarewiththerightsguaranteedbytheFirstAmendment.Concernsoverfree-
dom ofspeechandthefreedom ofthepresswereattheforefrontoftheAmerican
Revolutionandcontributed,inpart,tothedecisiontobreakawayfrom England.102
Bycontrast,concernsoverfreedom totravelwerenotcentraltothedecisionto
breakawayfrom England.103Similarly,theFramersoftheBillofRightsdeemedthe
righttointernationaltravelnotnecessaryforspecificenumeration.104
Anotherproblem withthistheoryisthatitgainedvirtuallynotractionwiththe
Court.InAptheker,noneoftheJusticesjoinedJusticeDouglasinhisconcurrence,105
andinthelaterZemel case, only one Justice signed on to support Justice Douglass
98 Id.
99 Brandenburgv.Ohio,395U.S.444,447(1969)(percuriam).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 16566 (1965) ([T]he test of belief . . .
iswhetheragivenbeliefthatissincereandmeaningfuloccupiesaplaceinthelifeofits
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God . . . .); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 16267 (1878) (analyzing the meaning of religion and holding that
polygamydoesnotfallunderFirstAmendmentprotections).
101 U.S.CONST.amend.I (Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,orprohibitingthefreeexercisethereof;orabridgingthefreedom ofspeech,orof
thepress;ortherightofthepeoplepeaceablytoassemble,andtopetitiontheGovernment
for a redress of grievances.).
102 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941) (noting the generally accepted his-
torical belief that one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common
law on liberty of speech and of the press (quoting Henry Schofield, Freedom of the Press
in the United States,9AM.SOC.SOCY 67,76(1914))).
103 See CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 13.
104 Id.
105 Aptheker v. Secy of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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dissent.106 Infact,themajorityinZemel explicitlyrejectedthenotionthatgovern-
mentrestrictionontravelimplicatedtheFirstAmendment.107TheCourtinHaig v.
Agee alsocasteddoubtonwhethertheFirstAmendmentspoketointernational
travel.108 Moreover,thistheorydoesnotcontemplatethemodernimpedimentto
international travel discussed in this Note communicable diseases. Justice Douglass
FirstAmendmenttheorycanbestbethoughtofasaproductofimmediatecircum-
stances.InZemel andAptheker,thegovernmentpoliciesunderreviewwerefounded
onafearofcommunism andthedisseminationofcommunistpropaganda.109Accord-
ingly,thosecasesclearlycaledthefreedom ofspeechintoquestion.TheFirstAmend-
mentfit,forZemel andAptheker,inawaythatisinapplicabletorestrictionsfounded
oncommunicablediseases.
D. Substantive Due Process
A fourthpossiblehomefortherighttore-enterisinsubstantivedueprocess
doctrine. The freedom to travel may stem from the word liberty, which is protected
bytheDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment.110 TheDueProcessClause
provides heightened protection against government interference with certain funda-
mental rights and liberty interests.111 Inascertainingwhetheraparticularsubstan-
tiverightisprotectedbytheDueProcessClause,theCourtlookstowhetherthe
proffered right is objectively deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition112
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.113 TheCourtrecognizesawide
rangeofrightsasdeeplyrootedandimplicitinliberty,including,butnotlimitedto,
therighttoanabortion114andtherighttodeclinelife-savingmedicalassistance.115
Unliketheotherpossiblesourcesfortherighttore-enterthecountry,substantive
dueprocessdoctrineprovidesanacceptablelevelofprotection.
The first three criteria those relating to the strength of the right in various situa-
tions are all met when the right to re-enter is guaranteed through substantive due
process.Oneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofsubstantivedueprocessjurisprudence
is that it permits a consideration of the governments interest.116 Thisallowsfora
106 381U.S.1,23(1965)(Douglas,J.,dissenting).
107 Id. at16(majorityopinion).
108 453U.S.280,308(1981).
109 See generally Zemel,381U.S.at1;Aptheker,378U.S.at500.
110 Jonesv.Helms,452U.S.412,418(1981).
111 Washingtonv.Glucksberg,521U.S.702,720(1997).
112 Moorev.CityofEastCleveland,431U.S.494,503(1977).
113 Palkov.Connecticut,302U.S.319,325(1937).
114 See PlannedParenthoodofSe.Pa.v.Casey,505U.S.833(1992).
115 Cruzan v. Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
116 See TimothyP.Lydon,Note,If the Parole Board Blunders, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Set the Prisoner Free? Balancing the Liberty Interests of Erroneously Released Prison-
ers,88GEO.L.J.565,567(2000)(describingonetestusedtoresolvesubstantivedueprocess
claims as weighing state interests against an individuals competing . . . liberty interests).
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balancingofcompetingintereststhatiscrucialtosatisfyingthefirstthreecriteria.
Thefirstcriterionismetbecause,inascenariowhereanindividualposesnothreat
to the publics health, the individuals interest in returning will trump any govern-
mentinterestinexcludingthereturn.Thesecondcriterionismetbecause,ifthe
governmentcantakereasonablestepstobringaninfectedcitizenhome,theindivid-
uals interest will outweigh the governments interest and the right will stand. On
theotherhand,ifthemeasuresnecessarytopermitsafere-entryintothecountry
wouldbeunreasonablycostlyorrisky,thegovernmentcouldlegallydenyre-entry.
The third criterion is met because the right will yield and the government will be
able to legally exclude a citizen in cases where the governments interest in pro-
tecting the majority outweighs the individuals interest in returning. The fourth criterion
ofharmonyisalsomet.
Amongstthelonglistofrightsprotectedthroughsubstantivedueprocessare:
therighttoprivacy,117therighttolearnlanguagesotherthanEnglish,118andtheright
torefuseunwantedmedicaltreatment.119Liketherighttotravelinternationallyand
subsequentlyreturn,theseareimportantrights;however,itisunlikelythatanyone
wouldlistthem amongstthetopfivemostimportantrights.120 Additionally,many
oftherightsenshrinedinsubstantivedueprocessdoctrineareenjoyingincreased
popularityasoflate.121TheyareundeniablymoreimportanttotheaverageAmeri-
caninthetwenty-firstcenturythantheywereintheeighteenthcentury.Manyofthe
rightsalreadyprotectedinsubstantivedueprocessdoctrinearose,orbecamemore
ofaneverydayconcern,becauseofadvancementsintechnology.122 Concernfora
substantivedueprocessrighttousecontraceptiveswassparkedbythedevelopment
ofasafe,discrete,andreliablecontraceptivemethod.123 Constitutionalpushbacks
117 See Griswoldv.Connecticut,381U.S.479(1965).
118 See Meyerv.Nebraska,262U.S.390(1923).
119 See Cruzan,497U.S.at261.
120 See, e.g.,William Booth,The U.S. Citizenship Test: Learning, and Earning, Their
Stripes,WASH.POST,Nov.17,1996,atC03(statingthattherighttovoteisthecorrectanswer,
for the purposes of citizenship exams, to the question [W]hat is the most important right
granted to United States citizens?);Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities,U.S.CITIZEN-
SHIP& IMMIGR.SERVICES,http://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and
-responsibilities[http://perma.cc/D8YB-Q7QR](omittingtherighttointrastate,interstate,
andinternationaltravelfrom alistofrightscompiledtoinform potentialnew citizens).
121 See, e.g.,Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (Until about [1976] . . . the number of right-to
-refuse-treatment decisions was relatively few.); Martha J. Bailey, Mommas Got the Pill:
How Anthony Comstock and Griswoldv.ConnecticutShaped US Childbearing,100AM.
ECON.REV.98,110(2010)(The post-Griswold increase[incontraceptionuse]isconsistent
withtheideathatwomen...wouldhavebeenusingthebirthcontrolpillingreaternumbers
had laws not been so restrictive.).
122 See supra note121andaccompanyingtext.
123 ClaudiaGoldin& LawrenceF.Katz,The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Womens Career and Marriage Decisions,110J.POL.ECON. 730, 73235 (2002); see also
Oral Contraceptives: The Liberator,ECONOMIST,Dec.23,1999,http://www.economist.com
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against government restrictions on an individuals ability to refuse life-sustaining
treatmentaroseasmedicaladvancementsextendedlifeexpectancy.124
Inthisrespect,internationaltravelissimilartotherightscurrentlyprotectedby
thesubstantivedueprocessdoctrine.Pushestorecognizetheabilitytotravelinter-
nationallyasaconstitutionalrightareatwentieth-centuryphenomenon.125Advance-
mentsintechnologymakeitpossibletoflytoEuropeorAsiaandgettherefaster
thaneverbefore.Importantly,thecostofinternationaltravelhasdroppedsignifi-
cantlywiththenew technology,makingitmoreroutineforAmericanstotravel
internationally not just the wealthy.126 Thecombinationoffastermeansoftrans-
portationandcheaperfareshasprofoundlyincreasedtheprevalenceofinternational
travel.127 Moreandmorepeoplearefindingemploymentinpositionsthatrequire
internationaltravel.128Simplyput,therighttotravelismoreimportantnow thanit
was in the eighteenth century and it is only becoming even more important. Inter-
nationaltravelis,therefore,similartoothersubstantivedueprocessrights,inthatthey
allprotecttwentieth-totwenty-first-centuryneedsandaretrendingtowardincreased
importance.Becausetherighttore-enterthecountryiscomparabletothealready
recognizedsubstantivedueprocessrights,itmakessensetohousethem allunder
thesameclause.
Havingdeterminedthatsubstantivedueprocessdoctrinewouldsatisfyallofthe
criteria,thetextualhomefortherighttore-enterthecountryshouldbetheDueProcess
ClauseoftheFifthAmendment.Ofcoursethisdeterminationisjustthebeginning
of this rights analysis. There are questions that still need to be answered. Therefore,
thisNotewillnow explorehow therighttore-enterwouldbeanalyzedunderthe
substantivedueprocessdoctrine,inthecontextofdeniedre-entryduetoinfection
with a serious communicable disease. A substantive due process formula, for the
purposesofcommunicablediseases,willfirstbeconstructed.
V.THEFORMULA
TheSupremeCourthasrepeatedlyheldthattheDueProcessClauseoftheFifth
Amendmentgivesindividualstwodistinct,yetintertwinedtypesofprotectionfrom
/node/347484[http://perma.cc/5YSD-89D3](callingthebirthcontrolpillthemostimportant
inventionofthetwentiethcentury).
124 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (stating that cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment have burgeoned in light of medical advancements, making it possible to sustain life
well past the point where natural forces would have brought certain death in earlier times).
125 See generally Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding the Secretary of States
denialoftraveltoCuba);Kentv.Dulles,357U.S.116(1958)(overturningtheSecretaryof
States decision to refuse passports to alleged communists).
126 See RAYMONDA.AUSROTAS,MIT FLIGHT TRANSP.LAB.,NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT
165654,PREDICTING THEIMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT ON INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION DEMAND (1981).
127 See id. at3.
128 See id. at11.
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governmentactions.129Thoseprotectionsaresubstantivedueprocessandprocedural
dueprocess.130 The substantive due process doctrine can be defined as the body of
law produced by thecourtsasthey employ thedueprocessclausesto review
government action on its merits.131Thekeyinquiryinanalyzingasubstantivedue
process claim is whether an asserted right is fundamental.132Thisinquirylargely
hingesonhistoricaltradition.133 A profferedsubstantivedueprocessrightismore
likely to be found fundamental if it is deeply rooted in this Nations history and
tradition.134 However,abackward-lookingperspectiveisnottheonlyapproacha
courtwilltakewhenevaluatinganassertedright.135RecentCourtdecisionssuggest
usinganothertool:examinationofthecollectiveconscienceofthenation.Infact,
a forward-looking perspective was crucial to the Courts decision in Lawrence v.
Texas,136 where the majority found an emerging awareness of the notion that the
privatesexlivesofallconsentingadultsoughttobedefended.137 Moreover,the
precisemannerinwhichanassertedrightisframedcanbecontrollingforthepur-
posesofthisinquiry.Forexample,inBowers v. Hardwick,138theCourtdefinedthe
relevant right as the right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy.139 Sodefined,
theCourtrejectedtheassertionthatsucharightwasfundamental.140Inalatercase
arisingundersimilarcircumstances,however,theCourtrecraftedtheinquiryand,
instead,definedtherelevantrightastherightofconsentingadultstoengagein
privateconduct.141 Aftertweakingtheinquiry,theCourtfoundthatsucharightis
infactfundamentalandprotectedbysubstantivedueprocess.142 AsBowers and
Lawrence show, the exact manner in which a right is defined for example, whether
itisbroadlyframedastherighttotravelinternationallyornarrowlyframedasthe
129 UnitedStatesv.Salerno,481U.S.739,746(1987)(addressingtheconstitutionality
oftheBailReform Act).
130 Id.
131 MichaelJ.Phillips,The Substantive Due Process Rights of College and University
Faculty,28AM.BUS.L.J.567,569(1991).
132 Renov.Flores,507U.S.292,305(1993)(explainingtheappropriatestandardof
review inanalyzingINS deportationprocedures).
133 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72021 (1997); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land,431U.S.494,501(1977)(pluralityopinion).
134 Washington,521U.S.at721(quotingMoore,431U.S.at503).
135 CountyofSacramentov.Lewis,523U.S.833,857(1998)(Kennedy,J.,concurring)
([H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.).
136 539U.S.558,572(2003).
137 Id. at 572 (relying on the American Law Institutes recommendations, trends in state
laws, and more when examining the nations emerging awareness).
138 478U.S.186(1986).
139 Id. at190.
140 Id. at 19091.
141 Lawrence,539U.S.at578.
142 Id.
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right to return from abroad may have a considerable impact on its analysis as a
substantivedueprocessright.143
Whenanassertedsubstantivedueprocessrightisimplicatedandfoundtobenot
fundamental, the government may infringe upon that right if there is a reason-
able fit between governmental purpose . . . and the means chosen to advance that
purpose.144 This reasonable fit standard is deferential to government action;145
therefore,ifanassertedrightisnotfundamental,itmaybereadilyinfringedbythe
government,providedthegovernmentcanshow some plausiblejustificationforthe
infringement.Whenasubstantivedueprocessrightisimplicatedanddeterminedto
be fundamental, the government is not automatically precludedfrom actingina
way that restricts the right; the governments intrusion is permissible provided it is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [government] interest.146
Applyingboththehistoricaltraditionandemergingawarenessteststotherightto
re-entershowsthatthisrightoughttobeconsideredfundamental.Underthebackward-
looking perspective of whether the right is deeply rooted in the countrys history
andtradition,therighttore-enterappearstobefundamental.Therighttore-enter
thecountryis,moreorless,expresslylistedinthreeofourfourmostimportantlegal
documents:theMagnaCarta,147theDeclarationofIndependence,148andtheArticles
ofConfederation.149 Eventhoughtherighttore-enterthecountryisnotexpressly
mentionedintheConstitution,thatsilenceisreadilyexplainedandshouldthusnot
diminish the rights importance.150 Participationinglobalaffairsrequires,andhas
alwaysrequired,theabilitytoleavethecountrytoconductbusinesswiththeassur-
ance of ones ability to return thereafter. Moreover, the ability to re-enter the country
bearsonourcapacitytocontinueourmostintimaterelationshipswithfriends,family,
and loved ones. Surely rights protecting those relationships are deeply rooted in
the nations history and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.151
Throughtheforward-lookingperspectiveofwhethertherightissupportedby
an emerging awareness of its importance, the right to re-enter again passes as funda-
mental.Allofthehistoricalconsiderationsareamplifiedbytheincreasedprevalence
143 See, e.g.,id. at558;Bowers,478U.S.at186.
144 Renov.Flores,507U.S.292,305(1993).
145 Id. at 30203 (upholding the government action where the right was determined to not
befundamental).
146 Id. at302.
147 See MAGNA CARTA,art.XLII.
148 THEDECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (1776) (He has endeavoured [sic] to
preventthepopulationoftheseStates;forthatpurposeobstructingtheLawsforNaturaliza-
tionofForeigners;refusingtopassotherstoencouragetheirmigrationshither,andraising
the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.).
149 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of1781,art.IV,para.1.
150 See supra notes 4447.
151 Palkov.Connecticut,302U.S.319,325(1937);see also Bowersv.Hardwick,478
U.S.186,214(1986).
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of international travel in todays world. The enumeration of this right in the UDHR
isfurtherevidencethattherightisenjoyingincreasedglobalrecognitioninmore
recentyears.152
Thefourcriteriadiscussedherein,indicatethatthebesttextualhomeforthe
rightisthroughthesubstantivedueprocessdoctrine.Havingdeterminedthatthe
right to re-enter the country should qualify as fundamental, there is finally a
formulathatcanbeusedtoanalyzegovernmentrestrictionsonthisrightinthe
contextofcommunicablediseases.Thehistoricaltraditionoftherightaswellas
forward-looking considerations indicate that the right is a fundamental right for
thepurposesofsubstantivedueprocess.Accordingly,thegovernmentshouldbe
justifiedinpreventingaU.S.citizenfrom re-enteringthecountryonlywheredoing
so is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [government] interest.153Everynew
formula,however,oughttobetested.Testingthisprofferedanalysisfortherightto
re-enter,when pitted againstthethreatofacommunicabledisease,isdifficult
becausetherearenocasesonpointtoseewhetherthisframeworkwouldwork.In
otherwords,thereisnodatawithwhichtotesttheformula.Tohelpwiththis
dilemma,itmaybeusefultoanalogizethethreatofcommunicablediseasestothe
threatofterrorism.Muchlikethethreatofacommunicabledisease,thethreatofa
possibleterroristattackcanbethebasisforagovernment-imposedrestrictionon
travel.Unlikethecommunicablediseasescenario,however,thereareactualcases
onpointinthecontextoftheNoFlyList.154 Thesecasescansupplythedatawith
whichtheformulamaybetested.Ifpluggingthefactsfrom variousNoFlyList
casesinto the fundamentalsubstantive due processrightframework produces
desirableresults,thenthesamedesirableresultsshouldbeexpectedinthecontext
ofcommunicablediseasecases.
A. Testing the Formula: Applying Substantive Due Process to the No Fly List
ThroughtheNoFlyList,theFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)andother
government agencies can utterly shut down a persons ability to return to the United
States.AlthoughtheNoFlyListisactuallymaintainedbytheTransportationSecurity
Administration (TSA), the names on the list are largely compiled from classified
evidence collected by confidential sources.155 Severalagenciesworktogetherto
add names to the list; however, the largest role is played by the FBIs Terrorist
ScreeningCenter(TSC).156TheNoFlyListissomethingofamisnomerbecauseit
152 G.A.Res.217(III)A,supra note53.
153 Renov.Flores,507U.S.292,302(1993).
154 See, e.g.,Mohamedv.Holder,995F.Supp.2d520(E.D.Va.2014).
155 JustinFlorence,Note,Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist
Watchlists,115YALEL.J.2148,2155(2006).
156 Id.
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reachesbeyondairlinesandmayalsorestricttravelviatrainsandships.157Theexact
numberofnamescontainedonthelistisnotdisclosedtothepublic,butsomesources
estimatethatasmanyas325,000peopleareonit.158ThestatuteauthorizingtheNo
FlyListisevenmorevague(readbroader)thanthatauthorizingdeniedre-entryfor
communicablediseasepurposes.159 Under 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3), the TSA may use
informationfrom governmentagenciestoidentifyindividualsonpassengerlistswho
may be a threat to civil aviation or national security.160Onceanindividualisidentified
as a threat, the TSA may prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take
other appropriate action.161Theeffectstriggeredbyplacementonthelistcancause
aseriousburdenonanindividuals ability to travel. The2014U.S.DistrictCourt
fortheEasternDistrictofVirginiacase,Mohamed v. Holder,isrepresentativeof
thismatter.162
GuletMohamedisacitizenoftheUnitedStatesandaresidentofVirginia.163In
March 2009, he temporarily left the United States to learn Arabic and connect with
members of his family living abroad.164 Whileoverseas,hetraveledtoYemen,
Somalia,andKuwaitwithoutanytrouble.165 MohamedallegedthatinDecember
2010,afterattemptingtorenew hisKuwaitivisitors visa, agents of the U.S. govern-
mentdetained,interrogated,andtorturedhim.166Mohamedeventualyobtainedaticket
toreturntotheUnitedStatesonJanuary16,2011.167However,afterarrivingatthe
Kuwaitiairport,officialsdeniedhisentryontotheplane.168Finally,onJanuary20,
2011,MohamedsuccessfullyboardedacommercialplaneandreturnedtotheUnited
States.169 Mohamed wasneithercharged nordetained upon hisarrivalhome.170
MohamedthenfiledanactionagainsttheAttorneyGeneral,thedirectoroftheFBI,
andthedirectoroftheTSC.171Inhiscomplaint,heallegedthathisplacementonthe
NoFlyListviolatedhisconstitutionalrights.172 Specifically, he aleged a violation of
his right as a U.S. citizen to reside in the United States and reenter it from abroad.173
157 Id. at2154.
158 Id. at2153.
159 Compare 49U.S.C.§114(h)(3)(2012),with 42U.S.C.§265(2012).
160 49U.S.C.§114(h)(3)(A).
161 Id. §114(h)(3)(B).
162 995F.Supp.2d520(E.D.Va.2014).
163 Id. at523.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at524.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at522.
172 Id. at 52425.
173 Id. at524.
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Beforediscussingtheactualoutcomeofthecase,theformuladevelopedinthe
previoussectioncanbetestedusingthesefacts.Pursuanttotheformula,thegovern-
mentwaslegallyauthorizedtodenyre-entrytoMohamed,ifdoingsowasnarrowly
tailoredtoserveacompellinggovernmentinterest.Inthiscase,thegovernment
interestisnationalsecurity.Itiswellestablishedthatnogovernmentinterestismore
compelingthannationalsecurity;174therefore,thefundamentalsubstantivedueprocess
rightformulawillsupportdeniedre-entry,providedthe denial was narrowly tailored.
Thefactorsthatshouldbeconsideredwhenanalyzingwhethertheactionwasnar-
rowlytailoredare:lengthofthedenial;whetherthegroupofpeopledeniedwas
over-inclusiveorunder-inclusive;andwhetherlessrestrictivemeanswereavailable
to fulfil the governments interest. The first step in testing the narrowly tailored
prongistoexaminethelengthoftimeduringwhichtherightwasdenied.Here,the
length of time probably cuts against Mohameds case because he was only denied
re-entryforafew days.175Thesecondstepistoaskwhetherthegovernmentaction
wasover-inclusiveorunder-inclusive.Ononehand,itistoughtomaketheargu-
mentthattheNoFlyListisover-inclusiveorunder-inclusivebecausetheexact
breadthofthelistisnotknowntothepublic.Ontheotherhand,however,thedenied
re-entry was over-inclusive in Mohameds specific case because he in fact did not
poseathreattonationalsecurity.176 The third step for the purposes of the narrowly
tailored inquiry is to ask whether there was a less restrictive means available for
satisfyingthegovernmentinterest.Here,thegovernmentcouldhavedoneafew
thingsdifferentlythatwouldhavebeenjustaseffectiveinmitigatingtheperceived
threat.TheycouldhavebroughtMohamedbacktotheUnitedStatesinisolation.
Theyalsocouldhavecompletedamorethoroughinquiryintohisbackgroundto
makeamoreinformedassessmentofhisthreatpotential.Thatsaid,thegovernment
couldarguethattheseprofferedalternativeswereinfactnotavailablegiventhe
costsandadministrativeburdensthatwouldbeassociatedwiththeirimplementa-
tion.Thisthirdstepislikelyawashunderthesefacts.Itishardtosaywhethera
considerationofless-restrictivemeansfavorsMohamedorthegovernment.
TheendresultofapplyingthefactsofMohamed tothecommunicabledisease
frameworkisthatthereisnotaclearanswer.Reasonablepeoplecouldweighthese
threeconsiderationsdifferentlyandcometodifferentopinionsastowhetherthe
governments actions were narrowly tailored. However, one factor clearly sug-
gests a finding of no impermissible deprivation of Mohameds right to re-enter. That
factoristhelengthoftimeduringwhichhisrighttore-enterwasdenied.Thus,the
bestconclusiontodraw from theformulaisthatthegovernmentactionwasnotan
impermissible curtailment of Mohameds right. This predicted result can now be
comparedtotheactualresultofMohamed.
174 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 21819 (1944) (upholding the
internmentofJapaneseAmericansduringWorldWarII).
175 Mohamed, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 52324.
176 Id. at523(explainingthatMohamedwasstudyingArabicandvisitingfamily).
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TheMohamed courtacceptedasvalid,therightofaU.S.citizentore-enterthe
country.177 Infact,thedefendantsapparentlydidnotevencontesttheexistenceof
thatright.178Rather,thedefendantsarguedthattheconstitutionalrightonlyattaches
oncetheindividualarrivesataU.S.portofentry.179Inotherwords,thedefendants
contendedthattherighttore-entryappliesinonlycaseswherethecitizenisturned
awayataU.S.borderandnotincaseswheregovernmentactionsimpedehisability
togetonaplaneboundfortheUnitedStates.Thecourtdisagreedwiththedefen-
dants and held that [a]t some point, governmental actions taken to prevent or
impede a citizen from reaching the boarder [sic] infringe upon the citizens right to
reenter the United States.180Inmakingthisdistinction,thecourtassignedabroader
scopetotherighttore-entry.Ratherthanconsideringonlythenarrow situationof
beingdeniedaccessataborder,thecourtrecognizedthatgovernmentactionscan
havethepracticaleffectofunconstitutionallydenyingre-entry,notwithstandingthat
anindividualmaybethousandsofmilesawayfrom theborder.181
Ultimately,theMohamed courtconcludedthattheallegationsdidnotgiverise
to a constitutionally unacceptable violation of Mohameds right to re-entry.182 [T]he
fourtofive-daydelaythatMohamedexperiencedinhisabilitytoreentertheUnited
Statesdidnotundulyburdenhisrightofreentryandtherefore,asamatteroflaw,
did not constitute a constitutional deprivation.183Thepredictedresultmatchesthe
actual result. Additionally, the predicted result turned on the length of Mohameds
denial, and that consideration of time also seemed to be crucial to the courts deci-
sion.Inthiscase,theformulapassesmuster.
B. More Data Supporting No Fly List Cases
Othercourtshad theopportunitytoaddressfactpatternssimilarto thatin
Mohamed.A 2014U.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofOregoncase,Fikre v. FBI,184
similarlyinvolvedacitizenplaintiffwhohaddifficultiesreturningtotheUnited
Statesfrom abroadafterbeingplacedontheNoFlyList.185Inhisclaims,healleged
aviolationofhissubstantivedueprocessrighttore-enter.186TheFikre plaintifftook
hisclaimsonestepfurtherthanMohamedbyseekingbothaninjunctionagainstfuture
barred re-entry and to compel the U.S. Department of State to establish information
177 Id. at536.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 53637.
181 Id. at537.
182 Id. at539.
183 Id. at537.
184 23F.Supp.3d1268(D.Or.2014).
185 Id. at 127374.
186 Id. at1276.
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andprotocolstoassistUnitedStatescitizenstoreturntotheirhomelandwho,once
abroad, are placed in the No-Fly List.187 TheFikre court held that the plaintiffs
claimsestablishedasufficientlyripecaseorcontroversy,eventhoughtheplaintiff
wasneverunsuccessfulinanattempttoreturntotheUnitedStates.188 Thecourt
foundsufficientripenessinthefactthatacrediblesourcetoldtheplaintiffthathis
nameappearedontheNoFlyList.189 In other words, it is not necessary for Plaintiff
to attempt to make futile travel plans in order to establish constitutional ripeness.190
Takentogether,theMohamed andFikre caseslendsupportfortheideathatthefederal
governmentcanunconstitutionallydepriveanindividualoftherighttore-entry,
notwithstandingthefactthattheindividualisneitherataU.S.bordernorpresently
attemptingtoreturn.
TheFikre courtalsorecognizedtheexistenceoftherighttore-entryasafunda-
mentalsubstantivedueprocessright,andinthiscase,thatrightwasrecognizedover
adirectassertiontothecontraryonthepartofthedefendants.191 TheFikre court,
purportingtorelyontheMohamed decision,describedanexhaustionelementas
necessarytoaninfringementofthesubstantivedueprocessright.192Nosuchexhaus-
tionelementisapparentintheMohamed decision,yettheFikre courtfoundit
necessary.193Usingthisrequirement,theFikre court dismissed the plaintiffs claim,
findingthattheplaintiffcouldhavegonetotheembassyoverseastoattemptto
securepassagebacktotheUnitedStates.194
A finalcasefollowingsimilarfactpatternsastheMohamed andFikre casesis
the2014U.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofOregoncaseTarhuni v. Holder.195
TarhuniisanAmericancitizenofLibyandescentwhotemporarilyvisitedLibyato
perform humanitarianwork.196 TarhuniplannedtoleaveTunisiaandreturntohis
homeinOregonviaaninitialflighttoParisonJanuary17,2012.197 Attheairport
inTunisia,commercialairlinepersonnelinformedhim thathewouldnotbepermit-
tedtoboardhisplane.198LiketheMohamed andFikre plaintiffs, Tarhunis named
appearedontheNoFlyList,and,likethoseplaintiffs,Tarhuniclaimedthatthe
governmentviolatedhisSubstantiveDueProcessrightstointernationaltravel.199
187 Id. (citationomitted).
188 Id. at1278.
189 Id. at1279.
190 Id.
191 Id. at1282.
192 Id. ([T]o plead a substantive due-process claim based on a deprivation of the right to
returntotheUnitedStates,PlaintiffmustallegefactssufficienttodemonstratethatDefendants
have deprived him of every viable means of returning to the country.).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Tarhuniv.Holder,8F.Supp.3d1253(D.Or.2014).
196 Id. at1262.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at1265.
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TheTarhuni courtfollowedMohamed,findingaconstitutionallyprotectedsubstan-
tivedueprocessrighttointernationaltravel.200Thecourtthenexaminedtheextent
towhichplacementontheNoFlyListwouldhinderthatright,suggestingadherence
totheexhaustionelementofFikre.201 The court concluded that with the exception
ofarelativelyfew countriesinNorthandCentralAmerica,travelbyairisnot
merelythemostconvenientform ofinternationaltravel,but,giventimeandfinan-
cialrealities,travelbyairistheonly practicalmodeofinternationaltravelforthe
vast majority of travelers.202 TakentogetherwiththeFikre case,thisreasoning
indicatesthatdeniedaccesstoflights,inparticular,maybeenoughtoconstitutea
deprivation;however,onlybeingplacedontheNoFlyListmaynotbeenoughto
constituteadeprivationifotherchannelstoreturnhomeareavailable.
AstheMohamed,Fikre,andTarhuni decisionsindicate,districtcourtsarebe-
ginning to recognize and apply the right to re-enter in No Fly List cases. That
said,therearestillsignificantgapsintheright.Moreover,therightandthesubstan-
tivedueprocessformulahereinassignedtoit,haveneverbeendiscussedinthe
contextofrestrictedtravelduetothethreatofcommunicablediseases.
C. Returning to Communicable Diseases
TheMohamed,Fikre,andTarhuni triadofcasesseemstoindicatethatthefunda-
mentalsubstantivedueprocessframeworkwouldworkfairlywellinthecontextof
communicablediseases.Forstarters,eachofthosecourtsentertainedthenotionof
asubstantivedueprocessrighttotravelinternationally.Also,indifferingdegrees,
eachcourtflirtedwiththenarrowerconceptoftherighttore-enterthecountry.More-
over,eachcourtrecognizedthatthegovernmenthasahighlycompellinginterestin
national security. This translates well into the realm of communicable diseases it
suggeststhatcourtswillbeappreciativeofthesheernecessitytoabridgesomerights
intheeventofabonafidethreat.Inotherwords,itshowsthattheframeworkwould
likelyallow thegovernmenttodenyre-entrywhenabsolutelynecessarytostopthe
spreadofdisease.
Moreimportantly,eachcourtdisplayedawillingnesstoperform athoughtful
analysis of the narrowly tailored component. For example, the Mohamed courtde-
terminedthatafour-to-five-daydelayinre-entrywasacceptable.203 Thissuggests
thatacourtreviewingadeniedre-entryinthecontextofcommunicablediseases
wouldfindafour-to-five-daydelaywithintheconfinesofnarrow tailoring.Italso
suggeststhatcourtswouldconsiderfactorsthatbearonthenarrownessoftailoring
inthecommunicablediseasesscenario.Thosefactorsmayinclude:thevirulenceofthe
disease;theincubationperiodofthedisease;theavailabilityofsimplequarantine
200 Id. at1275.
201 Id. at1276.
202 Id. at1271.
203 Mohamedv.Holder,995F.Supp.2d520,537(E.D.Va.2014).
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measures;whethertargetedscreeningprocedurescanidentifyonlythoseindividuals
whoposelegitimatethreats;andtheavailabilityofadequatemedicaltreatmentout-
sideoftheUnitedStates.
CONCLUSION
Currently,thetwomostlikelyjustificationsthatthegovernmentwouldhavefor
restricting a persons re-entry into the United States are the containment of commu-
nicablediseasesandthepreventionofterrorism.Pursuanttoanumberofdisconcert-
ingly broad statutes, the government is empowered to deny a citizens re-entry into
thecountry.204Recenttechnologicaladvanceshavemadeinternationaltravelfaster,
cheaper,andmoreroutineformoreindividuals.Unfortunately,constitutionallaw
regardingtravelhasfailedtokeeppace.Thisfailureismadeblatantlyobviousby
thelingeringuncertaintyastowhethertherighttotravelandtherighttore-enterare
protected.ThepossiblesourcesoftherighttoreturnarethePrivilegesandImmuni-
tiesClause,theCitizenshipClause,theFirstAmendmentfreedom ofspeech,and
substantivedueprocessundertheFifthAmendment.
Protectingtherighttoreturnshouldbeaccomplishedbyusingsubstantivedue
process.Thistravel-centricrightissimilartotheotherrightsalreadyprotectedthrough
thisdoctrine,suchastherighttocontraceptionandtherighttorefuselife-sustaining
medicaltreatment.Moreover,thisrightalreadyhassupport,albeitshakysupport,
from decisionssuchasKent v. Dulles205 andMohamed v. Holder.206 Mostimpor-
tantly,however,therighttore-entershouldbeprotectedbysubstantivedueprocess
becauseitprovidestheappropriatelevelofprotection.Unlikethetheorythattravel
isprotectedbyvirtueofcitizenship,whichwouldplausiblyleadtonopermissible
governmentrestrictions,substantivedueprocesswouldallow courtstoengagein
balancing. If it is determined that the governments interest in maintaining the public
healthandsafetyoftheAmericanpeopleoutweighsagivencurtailment,thegovern-
mentwillbevindicatedinthatdecision.Thisisadesirableoutcome,especiallywhen
consideringthatmanyofthealternativeswouldnotalow foranygovernmentrestric-
tion and could seriously preclude the governments ability to protect its citizens
againstdiseaseoutbreaks.
Anymurkinessinapplyingtheprofferedsubstantivedueprocessformulatore-
entrycasescanbereducedbyestablishingclearprotocols.Bright-linerulesthatdelin-
eate the permissible length of a given travel restriction adopted either through statutes
or by CDC regulations would be very helpful and easy to implement. For example,
agovernmentimposedtravelrestrictionduetothefearofadiseaseoutbreakcould
204 49U.S.C.§114(h)(3)(2012)(NoFlyList);42U.S.C.§264(2012)(detentioninvolving
communicablediseases);id. §265(suspensionofentrycommunicablediseases).
205 357U.S.116(1958).
206 995F.Supp.2d520.
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statethatthelengthoftherestrictionissimplytheincubationperiodforthedisease.
Thiswouldassistcourtsinperformingthesubstantivedueprocessbalancingtestby
signalingwhatconstitutesapermissibledelayandwhatconstitutesanimpermissible
delay.Additionaly,suchabright-linerulewouldtelthoseindividualswhosere-entry
hasbeenrestricted,thelengthoftimethattheywillhavetowaitbeforereturning
home.Perhapsmostimportantly,additionalclarityintherighttore-enterwouldgive
bothassurancetopeopleliketheEbolamissionariesandunderstandingtoconcerned
citizensbackhome.
